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modifications is the near approach to a reasonable-use doctrine. In Edason
v. Denison it was reasonable, in the interest of improved husbandry, to
permit an increased flow that did not greatly inconvenience the lower
owner. Considering the total drainage problem in the area, the overall
social advantage was greater than the slight personal disadvantage.
It is interesting to note that Florida has not spoken of these problems in
terms of servitudes and other property rights and obligations but in terms
of tort liability.7 5 The next logical step in our law is to admit the appli-
cation of the reasonable-use doctrine. This would strike the middle road





A trust is a right of property, real or personal, held by one party for
the benefit of another.' The ordinary trust agreement, lacking indication
that the donor intends the beneficiary's interest to be inalienable by him
or his creditors, results in the beneficiary's being able to anticipate such
interest. Yet the trust device is extremely flexible and readily lends itself
to carrying out the intent of the settlor. A person wishing to provide a
fund for the maintenance of another, and at the same time to secure it
against the beneficiary's improvidence or incapacity for self-protection,
2
may accomplish his purpose by creating a spendthrift trust. It is not even
necessary that the "spendthrift" be a waster, incompetent, or in any way
below normal capacity. Under a typical spendthrift trust the beneficiary's
right to receive income is inalienable, either by his own act or that of his
creditors, during all or part of his life.3 Thus the primary characteristic
of the spendthrift trust is the right of the beneficiary to receive benefits
without subjecting them to the usual attendant liabilities. Similar security
"Seaboard All Florida Ry. v. Underhill, 105 Fla. 409, 141 So. 306 (1932).
'Keplinger v. Keplinger, 185 Ind. 81, 113 N. E. 292 (1916).
2Waterbury v. Munn, 159 Fla. 754, 32 So.2d 603 (1947).
3Ibid.
2
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from invasion by creditors of one holding a legal or equitable interest is
frequently accomplished elsewhere in the law by statutes involving life




The English law has consistently resisted efforts that have been made
to restrain alienation of property. 5 An early step in this process was a
statute enacted in 1285 defeating the old rule excluding land from the
claims of creditors.6 Two centuries later Taltarum's Case7 rendered the
entailment of land almost ineffectual: it provided a method whereby the
owner of an estate in fee tail might convert his interest into a fee simple.
The Rule against Perpetuities and the Rule against Restraints upon
Alienation furnish additional evidence of the aversion of the common law
toward attempts to make property inalienable.8 Many English cases have
held that if one haz title in fee or a life estate he may not enjoy the benefit
from it without the attendant burden of liability to creditors.9 Such a view
applies to an absolute equitable interest as well as to a legal title.' 0 Recent
trust legislation in England has made no change in this law."1
III. ORIGIN IN THE UNITED STATES
In the early Pennsylvania practice, there being no equity jurisdiction,
a creditor with an equitable right had no method of reaching the bene-
ficiary's interest. When the equity courts came into existence in that state,
the inalienable character of a beneficiary's interest had become so firmly
ensconsed in the jurisprudence that it was allowed to remain unmolested.'
2
'McIntosh v. Aubrey, 185 U. S. 122 (1902); Surace v. Danna, 248 N. Y. 18, 161
N. E. 315 (1928).
5GKiswLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS 4 (2d ed. 1947); 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 117-120 (3d ed. 1923); POLLOCK & MAITLAN, HISTORY OF ENGIzSH LAW
310-330 (1895).
013 EDw. I, c. 18 (1285).
TGRIswALD, SPENDmi ' TRusTs 5 (2d ed. 1947).
81bid.
'Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. 429, 34 Eng. Rep. 379 (1811).
21lbid.
1116 GFo. V., c. 18, §33 (1925).
1 2Ashurst v. Given, 5 W. & S. 323 (Pa. 1843); Hemmersley v. Smith, 4 Whart. 125
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In the case of Fisher v. Taylor,'3 the court pointed out that there was
never "a question, or doubt, as to the intention of the testator," because
the will creating the trust estate explicitly designated the uses and defined
the powers of the trustee. This clearly propounded the standards re-
quired to manifest one's intent to create a spendthrift trust. It was
further stated that the creditors of the spendthrift could not complain,
since they were bound to know the foundation upon which they extended
the credit, the will having been recorded.
These Pennsylvania cases were followed by the United States Supreme
Court in Nichols v. Eaton,'4 wherein Justice Miller propounded the
spendthrift-trust doctrine by way of dictum. Writers cite this dictum as
the greatest single factor contributing to the establishment of the spend-
thrift trust in the United States,' 5 although the case did not actually in-
volve such a trust but rather a provision for the termination, upon bank-
ruptcy, of a beneficiary's right and the substitution of a discretionary trust.
Recognizing the just and sound policy peculiarly appropriate to the juris-
diction of equity courts protecting creditors against fraud upon their rights,
actual or constructive, the holding was based on the fact that wills are re-
corded and creditors are put on constructive notice of the inability of a
debtor to alienate his property. The cases that were cited as authority
supporting the dictum, however, can be distinguished.' 6 The growth of the
spendthrift trust has continued steadily since that time.' 7
IV. EXTENT REACHED IN OTHIER JURIsDICTIONS
The spendthrift trust device in some jurisdictions has reached a vicious
stage. In one instance a spendthrift trust was said to exist even though the
will in question completely lacked words indicating that the trust property
"2 Rawle 33 (Pa. 1829).
"'91 U. S. 716 (1875).
"GRSwALD, SPNFNDrmuF TRusTS 22 (2d ed. 1947).
"8 Pope's Ex'rs v. Elliott, 8 B. Mon. 56 (Ky. 1848) (involving a trust for support;
the subsequent cases in the Kentucky jurisdiction have limited spendthrift trusts to
this extent); Campbell v. Foster, 35 N. Y. C. A. 361 (1866) (argument largely based
on the special provision of the statute regulating jurisdiction of the court in that type
of case, but to some extent founded upon the right of the owner to give his property
such direction as he may choose without making it subject to the debts of those on
whom he intends to confer his bounty).
"'Bennett v. Bennett, 217 Ill. 434, 75 N. E. 339 (1905); Kiffner v. Kiffner, 185
Iowa 1064, 171 N. W. 590 (1919); Robertson v. Schard, 142 Iowa 500, 119 N. W. 529
(1909).
4
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should be inalienable by creditors of the beneficiary.1 8 In another situa-
tion the court created even more confusion by pointing out that it must
"search for the intent of the testator only within the four comers of the
will," but added that this must be done in the light of all the circumstances
by which the testator was surrounded, and that the intent which was in-
ferred from such circumstances should not be defeated because his con-
veyance blundered.19 Another court went to the extreme of holding that
an obligation to pay alimony was just another debt and should not be en-
forced against a trust purportedly established for the beneficiary and his
present family.
20
In Seymour v. McAVoy,21 the majority opinion said that the Civil Code
did not apply because it was not in effect when the estate vested; there-
fore, the decision must be made in accordance with the rules of common
law as it existed in the United States and the English courts. It was stated
by the Court that at common law the settlor of a trust designed to pay an-
other the income of property might provide that the interest of the bene-
ficiary should not be subject to the claims of his creditors, and that such
provision need not be express but might be implied from the terms of the
trust in the light of all surrounding circumstances. The holding was
founded upon the idea that alienability is not an essential attribute of an
equitable life estate in property. The dissent correctly pointed out that
at common law these so-called spendthrift trusts were actually invalid,
saying in part, 2 2 "Certainly no man shall have an estate to live on, but not.
an estate to pay his debts with. Certainly property available for the pur-
poses of pleasure or profit, shall be also amenable to the demands of
8 ones v. Harrison, 7 F.2d 461 (C. C. A. 8th 1925). The only indication of the in-
tent of the testator to impose restrictions on the beneficiary's interest is found in the
use of the word "direct." The will required that the income be paid by the trustees
to the beneficiary direct. The court reasoned that such payments were not intended
to be made to alienee or creditors and that, since another portion of the property was
given to the son absolutely, this indicated that the trust property was to be pro-
tected from creditors.
1 Appeal of Grothe, 135 Pa. 585, 19 At. 1058 (1890). Here it was held that the
facts that the testator gave legacies to his other children absolutely, and that the son
was insolvent when the will was executed, were sufficient to show the intention to
create a spendthrift trust, although there was no provision in the will protecting the
income from attachment.
"Eaton v. Lovering, 81 N. H. 275, 125 At. 433 (1924) (spendthrift trust based
on the direction that all property bequeathed or devised to the son be held in trust
and invested and expended for his benefit as required for his needs).
1121 Cal. 438, 53 Pac. 946 (1898).
221d. at 445, 53 Pac. at 948.
5
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justice." Some cases, however, have held that language in an instrument
merely directing the trustee to apply income from the property to support
the beneficiary does not fulfill the desired requisite; thus, if nothing in the
instrument creating the trust prohibits alienation or anticipation, a spend-
thrift trust is not created.23 An example of a desirable result was mani-
fested in Dudley's Estate,2 4 which held that the lack of specific instruc-
tions by the donor prevented the protection of the beneficiary's interest
from his creditors. This is reminiscent of the English rule and is sup-
ported by commentators. 2 5
V. THE SPENDTHRIFT TRUST IN FLORIDA
It is common knowledge that the spendthrift trust is widely used in
Florida today; and because of this broad acceptance there are few reported
cases in which the validity of the doctrine is brought into issue.2 6 In an
early case2 7 the Court held that, even assuming such a deed could exempt
in this state property conveyed by it from the debts of the beneficiaries, if
the deed provided that the trustees convey any of the property to the bene-
ficiaries or convey at their direction, this provision virtually gave the
beneficiaries an absolute title to the property and such deed would not
exempt the property from the debts. The Court stated the general rule
that, when one has a property interest which he may alien or assign, such
interest, whether legal or equitable, is liable for the payment of his debts.
The latest case, Waterbury v. Munn,2 8 held that a codicil giving the
trustees, who were only income beneficiaries in the original will, power to
divide and sell the property at any time did not revoke the spendthrift
provision in the original will. An assignment of one beneficiary's interest
"Brown v. Macgill, 87 Md. 161, 39 Aftl. 613 (1898); Baker v. Keiser, 75 Md. 332,
23 Atl. 735 (1892).
2'3 F.2d 832, 834 (D. Md. 1925) (citing. Baker v. Keiser, supra note 23, holding
that even the class of cases in which intent of testator is clearly manifested "should be
carefully guarded and courts should not be inclined to exempt property from its usual
incidents of the right of alienation and liability for debts unless the language of the
donor be free from doubt."
"See generally GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION OF PROPERTY (2d ed. 1895);
Manning, The Development of Restraints on Alienation since Gray, 48 HA{v. L. REv.
373, 404 (1935).
2Waterbury v. Munn, 159 Fla. 754, 32 So.2d 603 (1947); Croom v. Ocala
Plumbing & Elec. Co., 62 Fla. 460, 57 So. 243 (1911).
'Croom v. Ocala Plumbing & Elec. Co., 62 Fla. 460, 57 So. 243 (1911).
"159 Fla. 754, 32 So.2d 603 (1947).
6
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to another was, therefore, held to be unenforceable. The case did not
abrogate the doctrine laid down in the earlier case, because the later suit
was brought to test the validity of the assignment, and the rights of the
creditors were not involved. The Court may choose to distinguish between
the two cases at a later period.
An interesting comparison is presented by an analysis of two recent
Florida decisions.2 9 In the earlier case3 0 the Florida Court abandoned
the common-law abhorrence of the spendthrift trust.3 ' The obvious re-
sult of this decision was a partial compromise of the time-honored policy
of free alienation. In a case decided the next year 3 2 the traditional
common-law restraint on the alienation of a possibility of reverter was re-
moved. The decision was reached without benefit of convincing statu-
tory authority and was reasoned, in part, on the desirability of free aliena-
tion. Thus in two cases decided but one year apart the Court has placed a
restriction on alienation of one interest and emancipated another from an
ancient restraint.
A study of the extremes reached in other jurisdictions,' however, will re-
veal the snares into which the courts may fall when indiscriminately using
the spendthrift doctrine in assuring justice.
VI. CONCLUSION
The position of the spendthrift trust in the United States is well estab-
lished, but to allow it to advance to the stages reached by some courts,
unchecked by judicial deterrent or by legislation, can result in gross in-
justice. The optimum use of such a device is to permit the owner of
property to direct expressly that such property be granted by the trustee
to the improvident recipient as needed for reasonable support and main-
tenance only. Application of the doctrine should be limited strictly to
those instances in which the settlor of the trust clearly states that his inten-
tion is to render it beyond the power of the beneficiary to alienate. This in-
tention should be stated so definitely that its appearance on the records
would be notice that the property is inalienable. In this way no creditor can
assert that he was not warned of the possible inability of the beneficiary
"Richardson v. Holman, 33 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1948); Waterbury v. Munn, 159 Fla.
754, 32 So.2d 603 (1947).
:'Waterbury v. Miunn, 159 Fla. 754, 32 So.2d 603 (1947).
'Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. 429, 34 Eng. Rep. 379 (1811).
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